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Nord Stream 2 divides the West
Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Rafał Bajczuk, Szymon Kardaś
In recent weeks the US has stepped up its campaign against the Nord Stream 2 project. Wash-
ington is putting pressure on Berlin to withdraw its support for the project, and is threatening 
to use increasingly powerful measures, including sanctions on European companies involved 
in the gas pipeline’s implementation. The growing dispute between the US and Germany over 
Nord Stream 2 has become an element of the broader controversy surrounding the project in 
the EU and is leading to deeper divisions between the member states. It has brought to the 
fore the differences in approaches to gas cooperation with Russia as well as approaches to 
the development of Russia’s strategic gas pipeline projects. While Germany, but also Austria, 
the Netherlands and a number of other countries, limit their approach to commercial issues, 
Poland, the Baltic States, Denmark and the US also see it as having security implications which 
do not only relate to energy. The conflict over Nord Stream 2 is also part of the game concern-
ing the future shape of the gas market in Europe, and the roles played by individual external 
suppliers (mainly Russia, but also to an increasing extent the US) and companies such as Gaz-
prom and its European partners. The Nord Stream 2 case has become a major challenge of the 
EU’s cohesion and its relations with the US and Russia. 
Gameplay on Nord Stream 2 brings short term political benefits to Russia. The project has not 
only caused a rift between the EU member states, it has also become a source of increased 
friction in transatlantic relations. The actions taken by Washington and Berlin with regard to 
Nord Stream 2 will have the greatest impact on its future. Although Berlin has changed its 
rhetoric and Chancellor Merkel has acknowledged that project has a political dimension in 
addition to the commercial one, Germany is unwavering in its support for NS2, trying to limit 
its negative consequences to problems regarding Ukrainian transit. Thus Berlin does not refer 
to the strategic concerns of the Central European and Scandinavian countries, the European 
Commission (EC) and the US which are not related directly to Ukraine. 
America’s tough game against Nord 
Stream 2
The US has been opposing the implementa-
tion of Nord Stream 2 since the project was 
announced in 2015 during Barack Obama’s 
administration. During the presidency of Don-
ald Trump, the US’s stance on the matter has 
become entrenched. There are at least two 
reasons for the current US opposition to Nord 
Stream 2. First of all, the US perceives the pro-
ject as a challenge to Europe’s energy security, 
and the EU’s new gas links with Russia as hin-
dering diversification of the gas supply, and also 
the stability and security of Europe, especially 
Central and Eastern Europe. The current admin-
istration is thus continuing the traditional US 
policy towards new gas pipelines linking Russia 
and Europe. The opposition to Nord Stream 2 
as a challenge to European security has become 
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particularly relevant in the context of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and the Russian-Ukrain-
ian conflict in Donbas. The US position on the 
project is confirmed by statements of repre-
sentatives of the State Department, including 
by both the current and previous US Secretary 
of State. 
Secondly, Washington’s opposition to NS2 
could help accomplish the Trump administra-
tion’s energy policy goal, which is to increase 
exports of US LNG – including to the Europe-
an market. The support for domestic exports 
is in part testified by the comments made by 
Donald Trump (for example, during his visit to 
Poland and during the US-Baltic summit), and 
by the Secretary of Energy. According to them, 
a higher level of US LNG exports could contribute 
to the diversification of supplies in Europe and 
a reduction on the dependence on Russian sup-
plies, mainly in Central & Eastern Europe. 
The key American instrument impacting on 
Nord Stream 2 implementation is the so-called 
CAATSA1 – the sanctions package imposed on 
Russia in 2017, affecting, among other things, 
the Russian energy sector and existing or 
planned export pipelines from Russia (among 
them Nord Stream 2, the only project referred 
to by name). Germany, a range of other Euro-
pean countries, and the European Comission2, 
protested against the US law introducing the 
sanctions. As a result of European, including 
German, lobbying efforts, the document and 
State Department instructions on CAATSA im-
plementation, was supplemented by the provi-
sion that the potential launching of sanctions 
should be “in coordination with allies”, but ulti-
mately the US president has the right to decide 
to impose them by himself.
1 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act, US Department of Treasury, 2.08.2017.
2 For more on this subject see S. Kardaś, I. Wiśniewska, 
Ustawa o amerykańskich sankcjach wobec Rosji, “Analizy 
OSW”, 4.08.2017 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikac-
je/analizy/2017-08-04/ustawa-o-amerykanskich-sankc-
jach-przeciwko-rosji
In recent months, the likelihood of CAATSA 
being imposed on European firms involved in 
Nord Stream 2 has increased3. This is illustrat-
ed by the increasingly frequent warnings, e.g. 
on 17 May in Berlin, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary at the Bureau of Energy Resources, San-
dra Oudkirk said that the US was “exerting as 
much persuasive power as we possibly can” to 
stop the project, and reiterated the possibility 
of sanctions. European diplomats also consider 
sanctions likely. 
Nord Stream 2 is also the subject of increas-
ingly intensive American political efforts. 
It became one of the subjects discussed by the 
US president with EU leaders (Trump discussed 
NS2 with presidents of the Baltic countries and 
Chancellor Merkel). According to media reports 
Trump was to offer Merkel a return to negotia-
tions on a new EU-US trade agreement4 if Ger-
many withdraws its support for Nord Stream 2. 
US diplomacy activity on the project has also 
intensified in recent months. State Depart-
ment officials have been openly criticising Nord 
Stream 2 in Brussels and Berlin, calling upon 
member states to oppose the project, and en-
couraged some of them, for instance Denmark 
and Sweden, to take measures to hamper NS2 
implementation. Security challenges in the Bal-
tic Sea area have also been raised publicly, such 
as the greater risk of surveillance by Russian 
3 For example R. Gramer, K. Johnson, D. De Luce, U.S. 
Close to Imposing Sanctions on European Companies 
in Russian Pipeline Project, “Foreign Policy”, 1.06.2018 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/01/u-s-close-to-im-
posing-sanctions-on-european-companies-in-russian-
pipeline-project-nord-stream-two-germany-energy-
gas-oil-putin/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
4 B. Pancevski, Trump Presses Germany to Drop Russian 
Pipeline for Trade Deal, “Wall Street Journal”, 17.05.2018, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-presses-germany-
to-drop-russian-pipeline-for-trade-deal-1526566415 
In recent months, the likelihood of US 
sanctions being imposed on European 
firms involved in Nord Stream 2 has in-
creased.
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intelligence once Nord Stream 2 is constructed 
(surveillance equipment on the Baltic Sea bed)5. 
It has also been reported that Trump might try 
to introduce the issues of gas and imports from 
Russia to the NATO discussions agenda6. 
At the same time, US efforts to support the di-
versification of gas supplies in Europe are con-
tinually visible. The construction of new LNG 
terminals, for instance in Croatia and Greece, 
supported by US diplomacy, could enable in-
creased EU imports of LNG, including from the 
US. In addition, the Americans have also been 
unequivocal in their support for other Europe-
an diversification projects such as the Southern 
Gas Corridor and the Baltic Pipe, and inter-
connections integrating the European market 
(among other things for the Slovak-Ukrainian 
interconnector which enables Ukraine to im-
port gas from the EU). US companies have also 
been involving in new European exploration 
projects (e.g. on the Romanian Black Sea shelf 
at present). 
The actual volume of US gas exports to Europe 
is determined by commercial decisions made by 
the private US firms selling LNG and the prices 
on global markets. Although US LNG exports to 
Europe rose in 2017 in comparison to 2016, it 
still represents a negligible portion of the EU’s 
overall needs – less than 1% of total imports 
– and cannot be compared with supplies from 
Russia, Norway, or Algeria. America’s most im-
portant gas importers remain Mexico, South Ko-
rea, and China (see diagrams 1, 2 and 3). In the 
first months of 2018, higher prices and demand 
resulted in rising US LNG exports to Asian coun-
tries, while only three cargos arrived in the EU.
5 A. Shalal, Russia-Germany gas pipeline raises intel-
ligence concerns - U.S. official, Reuters, 17.05.2018, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-germany-rus-
sia-pipeline/russia-germany-gas-pipeline-raises-intelli-
gence-concerns-u-s-official-idUKKCN1II0V7
6 J. Sicilano, Trump wants to make natural gas part of 
NATO discussions, “Washington Examiner”, 17.05.2018
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/
trump-wants-to-make-natural-gas-part-of-nato-discus-
sions
Diagram 1. Sources of gas imports to the EU, 
2017 
Source: Eurostat
Diagram 2. US LNG exports in 2013–2017 
(bcm)
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
Diagram 3. Directions of US LNG exports, 
2017
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
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Feigned change in the German policy 
towards Nord Stream 2
Since the Gazprom and five Western Europe-
an companies announced their plans to build 
Nord Stream 2 in June 2015, German diplomacy 
has supported the project and sought to im-
plement it in its original form – as an extrater-
ritorial gas pipeline. Germany wished to mini-
mise the European Commission’s role in Nord 
Stream 2 matters and opposed US involvement 
in project-related issues. US criticism of Nord 
Stream 2 and the actions undertaken (including 
sanctions against Russia, potentially affecting 
the project’s implementation) were interpreted 
as threatening not only German interests but 
also the EU’s entire energy policy, motivated 
by a desire to support the export of US LNG 
to the EU7. On the other hand, the German 
government, especially the Social Democrats, 
were seen to be continually lobbying in favour 
of Nord Stream 2. From 2015 until 2017, repre-
sentatives of the German government attended 
62 meetings related to the project. Most heavi-
ly engaged was Sigmar Gabriel, the former Ger-
man minister of economic affairs and energy, 
and subsequently foreign minister8. 
Germany’s support for NS2 construction did not 
wane when a new coalition CDU/CSU-SPD gov-
ernment was formed in March 2018, in which 
Peter Altmaier (CDU) took up the post of eco-
nomic affairs minister, and Heiko Maas (SPD) 
became foreign minister. There was however an 
evident change of the German rhetoric related 
to the project’s implementation, signalled by 
Angela Merkel (CDU) on 10 April at a meeting 
with Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, in 
Berlin. The Chancellor stated then that, apart 
from economic issues, political factors also had 
to be taken into account when assessing the 
7 See Außenminister Gabriel und der österreichische 
Bundeskanzler Kern zu den Russland-Sanktionen durch 
den US-Senat, 15.06.2017, https://www.auswaertig-
es-amt.de/de/newsroom/170615-kern-russland/290664 
8 Brisante Nähe, “Die Welt”, 15.12.2017, https://www.welt.
de/politik/deutschland/plus171601464/Brisante-Naehe.
html 
Nord Stream 2 project. Merkel pointed out the 
negative implications for Ukraine of decreased 
revenue from the transit of Russian gas, stating 
that Nord Stream 2 could not go ahead if Ger-
many did not receive guarantees regarding the 
future of Ukrainian transit. She made a similar 
announcement during talks with the Russian 
president, Vladimir Putin, and the Danish prime 
minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen. In a written re-
sponse to a parliamentary question on 14 May 
this year, we read that the German government 
has been taking decisive measures to obtain 
guarantees of the continued transit of Russian 
gas through Ukraine once the current agree-
ment expires and that it supports European ef-
forts to bring this about. In May 2018, Germany 
intensified diplomatic efforts regarding Nord 
Stream 2 and the future of Ukrainian transit. 
Both issues were raised during talks with Russia 
and Ukraine (visits by Heiko Maas to Moscow, 
Peter Altmaier to Moscow and Kiev, and Angela 
Merkel to Sochi). However, no binding assur-
ances from Russia were received on the contin-
uation of Russian gas transit via Ukraine. 
Berlin’s change of rhetoric regarding Nord 
Stream 2 was probably due to an increased risk 
of US sanctions and increasingly difficult rela-
tions with the US. The EU measures, (including 
an opinion issued by the EU Council’s legal ser-
vice in March 2018 confirming the need to con-
clude an international agreement in the case of 
gas pipelines from third countries such as Nord 
Stream 2, and the exclusive competence of the 
commission to negotiate it), and a reshuffle in 
Germany (both in the federal government and 
in the SPD), might also have influenced Berlin. 
The new German government continues to 
support Nord Stream 2, there was however 
a change of Berlin’s rhetoric – an acknowl-
edgement of negative implications for 
Ukraine of the project’s implementation.
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Berlin only slightly bowed to of the project, by 
seeking a solution to the only political problem 
officially acknowledged on its part (Ukraine as 
a transit country); it still wants the project to go 
ahead. At the same time, Germany is hoping to 
ease the tension in relations with the Europe-
an Commission – whose involvement in Nord 
Stream 2 related issues cannot be avoided, and 
which can be seen as a potential ally in some ar-
eas relevant to Berlin, such as relations with the 
US in the NS2 case. It seems even more prob-
able given that one of pivotal political goals of 
the EC is to guarantee the maintenance of tran-
sit via Ukraine. This is being promoted, for ex-
ample, in trilateral talks with Moscow and Kiev. 
The German government’s diplomatic offensive 
in May has demonstrated that Germany wish-
es to act as a mediator between Russia and 
Ukraine on the transit issue, while remaining 
a party directly interested in Nord Stream 2 go-
ing ahead. It is unclear whether its efforts in this 
regard have been agreed upon with the EC; Ber-
lin’s specific objective and negotiation strategy 
regarding Ukrainian transit are also clouded. 
It cannot be ruled out that, having obtained 
Russia’s guarantee of the continued transit of 
minimum gas volumes, Berlin will try to neu-
tralise Kiev’s resistance and present this as 
a success on the EU forum. 
The EU vs US-German games 
on Nord Stream 2 
Since 2015, the EU has been starkly divided 
over Nord Stream 2. Recent events relating to 
the project have exacerbated the dispute. Sup-
porters of the projects – above all Germany, 
but also Austria, France, and the Netherlands 
– see it primarily as a business venture and see 
forging better gas relations as an instrument 
facilitating the cooperation and restoration of 
both trust and good political relations. On the 
other hand, opponents of the project – Poland, 
the Baltic states, Slovakia, Denmark, and re-
cently also the United Kingdom – believe that 
in addition to posing a threat to those coun-
tries’ interests (impacting their gas markets’ 
development, planned diversification of supply, 
gas prices, and transit role) the construction 
of the gas pipeline will also challenge energy 
security across Europe and security in general. 
This is also the position of the EU’s neighbour, 
Ukraine. Ukraine is particularly keen to halt 
the scheme as it undermines its central role as 
a transit country for Russian gas to the EU.
Countries resisting NS2 see risks for the EU in 
Russia’s actions, preventing constructive, trust-
based cooperation, including in the gas sector. 
The European Commission also opposes Nord 
Stream 2 due to the potentially detrimental 
impact on the security of supply, competitive-
ness, and integration of the EU gas market, the 
unclear legal framework, as well as due to the 
political divisions the project has already gener-
ated in the EU. In order to establish a clear legal 
regime for the project and ensure it is subject 
to EU law, the commission initiated at the end 
of 2017 a process of seeking a mandate from 
the member states to negotiate an internation-
al agreement with Russia on Nord Stream 2 and 
to amend the gas directive of 2009. EC attempts 
were protested against by a range of mem-
ber states, including Germany, which de facto 
questioned the EC’s competence with regard to 
the project, and contributed to hampering EU 
work on the amendment to the directive. 
Consequently, US opposition and its actions with 
respect to Nord Stream 2 became part of a vivid 
and deep intra-European dispute regarding the 
project and deepened the earlier antagonism be-
tween the member states. The US are perceived 
Germany wishes to act as a mediator be-
tween Russia and Ukraine on the transit 
issue, it is unclear though whether its ef-
forts in this regard have been agreed upon 
with the European Commission.
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by some as almost the only hope for blocking 
the unwanted gas pipeline, while by the others it 
is accused of an unscrupulous and unacceptable 
promotion of its own export interests (these ar-
guments are usually made by Germany and the 
European companies involved in Nord Stream 2). 
It is symptomatic that those accusing the Ameri-
cans of politicising gas relations with the EU and 
promoting its own LNG exports disregard the 
predominantly private ownership of the US gas 
sector and they also defend the commercial na-
ture of Nord Stream 2, carried out by the Russian 
state-controlled Gazprom. 
The change in rhetoric of the new German 
government with regard to Nord Stream 2 has 
been noted and welcomed in Brussels. As a re-
sult, the EC offered Germany to join the trilater-
al EU-Russia-Ukraine talks aiming to devise the 
rules for Russian gas transit through Ukraine af-
ter the expiration of the current transit contract 
in 2019, and also to discuss in the same format 
the controversial aspects of NS29. Thus, Germa-
ny was the first EU country to have a chance 
of participating in the negotiations backed by 
the EU since 2014, and can share political ac-
countability for any solutions devised. Despite 
this, no information has been made public as to 
whether Germany accepted the EC’s proposal, 
or about the role it would play in those talks. 
9 Sefcovic proposes involving Germany in quadrilogue 
to ensure gas transit via Ukraine, Interfax Ukraine, 
16.04.2018, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/ 
499349.html/
It is also unclear whether and to what extent 
Germany’s position with respect to the Europe-
an Commission’s efforts to devise a clear legal 
regime for Nord Stream 2 has changed. 
Russia and the tensions regarding NS2 
Regardless of the mounting political pressure 
from the US and actions taken by the Europe-
an opponents of NS2, the Russian government 
officials and Gazprom have demonstrated un-
swerving determination to bring the project to 
fruition. This is evidenced by both by the prac-
tical measures taken by Russian side (building 
subsequent sections of the onshore infrastruc-
ture for NS2 in Russia, obtaining further per-
mits for construction of the offshore section of 
the gas pipeline and more – for more details see 
Appendix 1), and by Moscow’s and Gazprom’s 
political activity (for instance, the celebration of 
the 50th anniversary of the signing of the first 
contract for gas supplies to Austria). 
To justify the need to build Nord Stream 2, Russia 
points to a systematic increase in gas transmis-
sion to European users via Nord Stream 1 and 
the growth of Russian gas exports to Europe in 
recent years (including mainly to Germany, Aus-
tria, and the Netherlands – see diagrams 3 and 4). 
Moscow treats US opposition to Nord Stream 2 
and the prospect of increased US LNG export to 
Europe as a direct competition to their gas sup-
plies and as aimed at undermining Gazprom’s 
position in the EU. At the same time, President 
Putin, representatives of the Russian govern-
ment, and the management of Gazprom have 
all consistently emphasised since June 2015 their 
readiness to continue gas transit via Ukraine and 
to hold negotiations on this matter, while stress-
ing that its economic viability is a prerequisite 
for reaching an agreement10. 
10 Except in the case of categorical statements made by the 
head of Gazprom Alexey Miller: Миллер: Роль Украины 
в качестве транзитера газа сведется к нулю, “ВЗГЛЯД”, 
6.12.2014, https://vz.ru/news/2014/12/6/719045.html
Those accusing the Americans of politi-
cising gas relations with the EU and pro-
moting its own LNG exports disregard 
the predominantly private ownership of 
the US gas sector and they also defend 
the commercial nature of NS2, carried out 
by the Russian state-controlled Gazprom.
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Diagram 4. Russian gas exports to the European Union 2011–2017 (bcm)
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Diagram 5. Russian gas exports to EU countries 2014–2017 (bcm)
Based on FSU Argus data 
Diagram 6. Russian gas flows to Europe through Ukraine and Nord Stream 1, 2012–2017 (bcm)
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Due to the probable delays in the implemen-
tation of both Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream 
(Turkish Stream), and uncertainty over the fu-
ture legal regime for gas pipelines (sections 
running through EU territory), Russia may still 
need access to Ukrainian transit capacity once 
the current transit contract with Ukraine ends 
in 2019 (see Annex 2). This would increase the 
chances of concluding a subsequent transit 
contract and reaching a compromise. However 
such a scenario would not diminish the chances 
of Nord Stream 2 being built, i.e. achieving one 
of the major strategic goals of Russia’s external 
energy policy. 
The geopolitical manoeuvring surrounding 
Nord Stream 2 brings short term political bene-
fits to Moscow. The project initiated by Russia, 
has not only managed to divide EU countries, 
but has also become a source of rising tension 
in transatlantic relations. Yet the final outcome 
of the dispute over Nord Stream 2 for Russia 
will depend primarily on further moves taken 
by the US. Keeping Washington’s opposition 
to NS2 solely at the political and diplomatic 
level, and the mere threat of the US imposing 
sanctions on companies engaged in the pro-
ject, will probably not be sufficient to prevent 
its implementation. Moscow is hoping that the 
German government will not only continue its 
political support for Nord Stream 2 but also act 
as a diplomatic shield, mainly in the EU. Rus-
sia is also counting on further anti-American 
consolidation in Europe and beyond triggered 
by further unilateral actions by the US (and 
criticised in the EU) such as cancelling the Iran 
nuclear deal or the growing conflict in trade re-
lations between the US and the EU due to Pres-
ident Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminium. 
Nord Stream 2 would, however, very likely be 
halted should US sanctions be imposed directly 
on the project.
Conclusions
The Nord Stream 2 project has become one of 
the most important issues impacting on the 
shape of transatlantic and intra-EU relations. 
The crisis in transatlantic relations, the grow-
ing discord between Berlin and Washington 
regarding the Nord Stream 2 issue, the increas-
ingly harsh actions of the US, and Germany’s 
determination to carry out the project, indi-
cate that tension between Germany and the US 
will grow. Berlin’s policy with respect to Nord 
Stream 2 as well as the Trump administration’s 
actions, place the EU in a difficult situation, 
magnify the differences in interests and incon-
gruity within the EU.
The future of Nord Stream 2 will essentially 
be determined by whether Germany bows to 
mounting pressure from the US and withdraws 
its political support for the project. The deci-
sion to do this could lead to the development 
of a more cohesive EU policy on the project, 
and at least partially alleviate tensions with the 
US. This in turn would hamper the implemen-
tation of Nord Stream 2 and complicate both 
German and EU relations with Russia.
Were the US to shift from threats to action, by 
imposing sanctions on European firms involved 
in Nord Stream 2, then this would have a much 
greater impact. It would probably lead to the 
suspension of the project. Despite any poten-
tial political guarantees from Germany or even 
the EU, sanctions would probably make Euro-
pean companies - active globally, for instance, 
Shell and Engie - to withdraw from the project. 
Potential US sanctions, despite the aligned in-
terests of the US, some EU countries, and the 
EC in the NS2 issue, could however lead to 
a less flexible EU position and consideration of 
protective and retaliatory actions, that would 
deepen transatlantic discord. 
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1. Status of Nord Stream 2 project’s 
implementation
a. progress: 
– expansion of internal infrastructure in Rus-
sia necessary to launch the NS2 gas pipeline. 
On January 18, 2017 - on schedule – Gazprom 
completed construction of the Bovanenkovo – 
Ukhta 2 pipeline. In 2018, ahead of schedule, 
construction of the Ukhta–Torzhok 2 gas pipe-
line and the Gryazovets–Ust-Luga section could 
be completed (where gas will be directly inject-
ed into the offshore section of the gas pipeline);
– obtaining the complete set of construction per-
mits for Nord Stream 2 in Germany, Finland, and 
Sweden; the first approvals have been issued in 
Russia as well, where Gazprom will obtain a full 
set of permits in the next few months;
– continuing support for the scheme and ongo-
ing financial commitments on behalf of five Eu-
ropean companies: Uniper, Wintershall, Engie, 
OMV, and Shell. Explicit political support for the 
NS2 project from Germany and Austria, as well 
as support from France and the Netherlands; 
– political measures: since 2015, NS2 has been 
the subject of discussions by representatives of 
the Russian government and leaders of the Eu-
ropean countries from which companies are di-
rectly involved in the project (Germany, Austria 
and France). Russia has also begun a diplomatic 
offensive in countries which are sceptical of it. 
Gazprom has been stressing the strategic im-
portance of the project and the need for it to 
be carried out at frequent meetings with West-
ern European partners and at international in-
dustry events.
b. problems and challenges:
– objections raised by the Polish Office of Com-
petition and Consumer Protection prevented 
the Nord Stream 2 AG consortium from be-
ing created, and this led to a delay in devising 
the financing mechanism for the project. The 
scenario finally adopted shifts the entire fi-
nancial burden onto Gazprom, which remains 
the sole shareholder in Nord Stream 2 AG. the 
agreements reached (April 2017) with Europe-
an firms envisage on their part financial sup-
port in the form of loans to Nord Stream 2 AG. 
Gazprom has also increased its own spending 
on NS2 from RUB 102.4 bln (2017) to RUB 114.5 
bln (2018) and plans to incur almost RUB 417 
bln in loans and credit lines for investment pur-
poses, which is almost one third of the com-
pany’s investment budget (a record level in the 
company’s history); 
– despite statements made, contracts for con-
struction work for the offshore section of the 
gas pipeline have not been concluded yet. 
In December 2016 only a letter of intent with 
the Swiss company Allseas Group S.A was 
signed concerning construction of the first line 
of the gas pipeline. Contrary to the signals, no 
new firms have joined the project; 
– in June 2017 the European Commission 
launched the process to obtain a mandate from 
the member states to negotiate an internation-
al agreement with Russia on the legal regime 
for the gas pipeline, in an attempt to make NS2 
subject to EU energy law in the broadest scope 
possible; in November 2017 it also initiated 
a legislative process to amend the gas directive 
adopted in 2009, which was supported by the 
European Parliament;
– on 30 November 2017 Denmark amended its 
Act on the Continental Shelf with respect to ap-
provals by the Energy and Climate Ministry for 
the laying of pipelines and cables in Danish ter-
ritorial waters; as of 1 January 2018 decisions 
of this kind depend upon an investment being 
in line with Denmark’s foreign & security policy 
interests; 
– in May 2018 the Polish Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection instigated further 
competition infringement proceedings against 
firms involved in the Nord Stream 2 project, 
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suggesting that agreements on financing the 
project concluded in April 2017 were an at-
tempt to circumvent the objections the author-
ity raised in July 2016; 
– in May 2018 environmental protection or-
ganisations NABU and Client Earth contested, 
in Germany and Finland respectively, construc-
tion permits and operation permits for the gas 
pipeline issued in those countries. 
2. Russia’s position on gas transit 
via Ukraine
The key for negotiating any new transit agree-
ment with Ukraine will be Russia’s actual needs 
with respect to gas transit. Official statements 
from Gazprom representatives suggest the 
company is interested in the continued transit 
through Ukraine of a maximum of 10–15 bcm 
of Russian gas per year. However it cannot be 
ruled out that the company may be forced to 
enter into a contract for greater transit volumes 
than declared (40bcm or more) and longer vi-
ability (medium-term contract). It is possible 
that even once NS2 is constructed, Gazprom 
will not be able to use the full capacity of the 
pipeline. Although the future legal regime of 
NS2 remains unclear, the prevailing interpreta-
tion of EU law at the moment is that infrastruc-
ture passing through the territorial waters of 
Germany and Denmark should be subject to EU 
energy law, including to the Third Party Access 
(TPA) principle. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out 
that Gazprom might only have access to around 
half of the Nord Stream 2 capacity (27.5 bcm), 
and the procedure for obtaining an exemption 
from EU law might be lengthy – perhaps lasting 
up to several years. Assuming one line of the 
TurkStream gas pipeline is launched and a con-
stant level of Russian exports to European con-
sumers continues, Gazprom would be forced 
to transit about 50bcm of gas through Ukraine 
for a number of years. in such a scenario, the 
company might be interested in concluding 
a medium-term contract (for example for five 
years) with the Ukrainian side for such a tran-
sit volume. This could be attractive for Ukraine 
(according to recent economic viability).
